Firing costs are often blamed for unemployment. This paper investigates this well spread belief. The main points are two. First, firing costs are modelled in an efficiency wage model to capture their effects on employment through wages. Secondly, dismissal conflicts are modelled explicitly. In the context of imperfectly observable effort, a double moral hazard problem can arise and in turn firing costs reduced employment because they increase the rent to be paid to workers. The determinants of the double moral hazard problem such as the imprecise definition of dismissal causes are analysed. The main policy conclusion is that focus should move onto the clarification of the different causes of dismissal to minimise the room of interpretation. If so, then high enough severance payments in case of "unfair" dismissals can actually have a punishment role and prevent the double moral hazard problem.
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Introduction
Firing costs are often blamed for unemployment in Europe (see OECD (1995) , for instance). The aim of this paper is to investigate this widespread belief from a theoretical point of view. The model we build makes two main points. First, …ring costs are introduced in an e¢ciency wage model to capture their e¤ects on employment through wages. Second, dismissal con ‡icts are modeled explicitly and their cost is derived. In particular, two types of dismissals are considered, redundancies and disciplinary dismissals, where employers and employees have con ‡icting interests 1 . Despite the prevalent idea of the (negative) e¤ect of …ring costs on employment, specially among policy makers and employers, there are very di¤erent views among economists depending on the model used. For instance, according to the insider-outsider theory put forward by Lindbeck and Snower (1988) , …ring costs are a source of market power for incumbent workers (the insiders) vis-a-vis the unemployed (the outsiders). Insiders use their market power to exercise upward pressure on their wages and thereby generating unemployment. According to this view, the higher the …ring costs, the higher the unemployment.
A completely di¤erent view of …ring costs is the one by Lazear (1990) . He shows that if markets are perfect and complete, then ‡exible wages can undo all the e¤ects of …ring costs and, therefore, …ring costs are neutral on employment. Workers pay ex-ante a fee which is equal to the severance payment they get in case they are …red. If they keep the job, they get their fee back with higher wages. In such a world, for any level of …ring costs, it is always possible to write an optimal contract that undoes all the e¤ects of severance payments.
A third view of …ring costs highlights the possibility of …ring costs arising endogenously. This approach is motivated by the fact that sometimes …rms and workers negotiate severance payments which do not coincide with the ones legally set; or even, some …rms o¤er severance payments in the absence of employment protection legislation. Several authors have investigated this idea in di¤erent contexts. For instance, Booth and Chatterji (1989) construct a model of …rm-speci…c training where the returns to training are uncertain as well as the outside options for workers. In such a context, the costs of training are shared between the …rm and the worker because there exists the possibility that workers quit. In case of being dismissed, workers are compensated by this cost with a redundancy payment. Also, Booth (1997) argues that in a two-period model, where it is in the interest of …rms 1 The …rm has to compensate the worker when facing a redundancy while no compensation is required in a disciplinary dismissal.
1 to have long-term employment relationships, if workers are risk-averse they prefer a contract with redundancy payment, and risk-neutral …rms …nd it optimal to o¤er it. Finally, Saint-Paul (1996) explores how …ring costs arise endogenously in a dynamic e¢ciency wage model. Firms may chose to voluntarily o¤er …ring costs in their labour contracts because these help …rms to credibly commit to more stable employment policies in an uncertain environment.
These three views exposed above have radically di¤erent ideas of …ring costs. One could summarise crudely that …ring costs are "bad" according to the …rst view, "neutral" according to the second view or even "good" according to the third view since they can be an optimal instrument for …rms. Consequently, these three frameworks summarise all possible e¤ects of …ring costs over employment. The model presented here is an e¢ciency wage model where dismissal con ‡icts are costly. As it will be seen, modelling …ring costs in this way allows to integrate the three di¤erent views mentioned above.
Most of the existing work on …ring costs focuses on labour demand models and the only type of dismissals considered are redundancies 2 . These models are very useful for understanding the e¤ects of …ring costs on the dynamic functioning of the labour market. However, the e¤ects on aggregate employment are ambiguous and remain in partial equilibrium. The implicit assumption of labour demand models is that wages are exogenous and do not change in the presence of …ring costs 3 . In our model, wages are endogenous and …ring exogenous. In this way, the model highlights another dimension of …ring costs which is not captured by labour demand models. To focus on the e¤ects of …ring costs on the wage-setting is particularly important for those unemployment models in which in the long-run the unemployment rate is determined entirely by long-run supply factors (see Layard et al. (1991) ).
There is a commonly held idea that …ring costs are high because dismissal con ‡icts involve large administrative and legal costs and that these lead to higher labour costs. Although this point is often made, it is usually modeled in a simplistic way: …ring costs paid by …rms are assumed to be higher than the indemnity that …rms have to pay to workers 4 . But this is not actually the case in most European countries. Instead, the source of higher …ring costs has to do more with the fact that the legislation generally sets a higher severance pay for cases taken to court and declared "unfair" than for those considered "fair" by court. These terms are de…ned from the worker's perspective. An "unfair" case is when the court considers that the …rm is wrong and therefore the worker must receive the ("unfair") …ring cost because it is an unjust dismissal. The "fair" severance payment is the default indemnity for a dismissal. When a case is taken to court and is declared "fair", the court considers that the …rm is right and the worker simply receives the default 2 See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), Bertola (1990 and and Nickell (1978) . 3 An exemption of this is Bertola (1990 , the cost of a redundancy declared "fair" is 20 days' wages per each year worked with a maximum of 12 months' wages. But if the case is declared "unfair", the cost is more than double, 45 days' wages per year worked with a maximum of 42 months. This "unfair" rate also applies to disciplinary cases 6 . In this paper, we explicitly model dismissal con ‡icts and derive their cost. Con ‡icts between employers and employees can arise for very di¤erent reasons. In general, whenever …rms face a redundancy, they want to use disciplinary dismissals in order to avoid paying …ring costs. We model …ring costs in a context where worker e¤ort is not perfectly observable. This actually provides a rationale for the existence of workers' right to sue their employers in case of disagreement. In such a context, workers can be in a weaker position because …rms can get away with the use of disciplinary dismissals whenever they need to adjust their workforce (i.e. in case of redundancy). Therefore, there is a reason for job protection legislation to include the right for employees to take cases to court. The drawback is that workers will then tend to deny any disciplinary case to get a compensation (specially if the indemnity is higher when the case is declared "unfair"), again, because of the di¢culty in observing worker e¤ort. As it will be discussed, a double moral hazard problem could arise. Our claim in this paper is that the resolution of this problem by a third party will be imperfect given the information problem.
The existence of imperfect resolutions of dismissal cases will in turn imply that disciplinary dismissals will not be costless and …ring costs will have a negative e¤ect on aggregate employment. As it will be discussed at the end of the paper, the solution does not necessarily imply the elimination of …ring costs. Rather, what will appear to be important is the gap between the severance payment for cases considered "unfair" and those "fair".
We concentrate on dismissal con ‡icts of small/medium …rms for which "individual" dismissal regulation applies. In case of large …rms, redundancies are generally under the "collective" dismissal regulation which implies that the number of redundancies and their total cost are bargained with a third party (generally, unions) 7 . In our model, …rms will bear a …ring cost that is exactly the same as the indemnity received by the worker. As mentioned, this is the case for most European countries. In countries in which the administrative approval processes are very complex 8 , many of the cases are settled by the worker and the …rm out of court, precisely to avoid these costs. Therefore, again, …rms do not bear a higher cost than the indemnity received by workers. The worker receives a settlement which amount lies between the legal severance payment and the (expected) cost had the case gone to court. In this sense, the …ring costs due 5 See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1999) for a comparison of these indemnities in di¤erent OECD countries. 6 In this case, the di¤erence in costs of between a "unfair" and a "fair" case is extreme: 45 days' wages per year worked if "unfair" versus no compensation if "fair". to dismissal con ‡icts that are derived in the present model can be thought as the upper bound of what a worker could receive from bargaining with the …rm.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, …ring costs are described, and their implications for (e¢ciency) wages and employment are derived. In the last section, we discuss some policy implications.
The model
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) with …ring costs. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker's e¤ort is not perfectly observable and there is a detection technology that catches shirking workers (never erroneously) with some probability q (where q < 1). When a worker is found shirking, he is …red and becomes unemployed. Workers also have an exogenous probability, b; of being separated from their job for redundancy reasons 9 . In the next section we describe how …ring costs are modeled.
Redundancies and disciplinary dismissals in con ‡ict
Most industrialised countries have a job protection legislation framework that protects workers against redundancies. The idea is that a redundancy is an exogenous event to the worker and imposes a cost to him and thus he must be compensated for it. At the same time, employers are allowed to …re workers for disciplinary reasons without having to pay any compensation.
A framework where worker's e¤ort is imperfectly observable is best suited for considering another common feature of job protection legislation, namely the right for workers to sue employers in case of disagreement.
Whenever …rms need to adjust their workforce, they want to use disciplinary dismissals to avoid paying …ring costs. And the di¢culty in observing worker e¤ort means there is some chance that …rms can get away with such strategy 10 . The right for workers to sue employers in case of disagreement can compensate for this imperfection. But then, similarly to …rms, workers will deny any reasons for disciplinary dismissal to get a compensation based on unjust grounds. In such a context, both true disciplinary cases and hidden redundancies arrive to court as disciplinary cases. Court's decisions are based on whatever evidence (if any) is presented by the agents, which is not perfectly correlated with reality given the information problem. So, in general, courts are not able to perfectly distinguish between true disciplinary cases and hidden redundancies. Thus, the resolution by a third party will tend to be imperfect given the information problem. 9 The terms adverse economic shocks and redundancies are used interchangeably here. 10 Malo (1998) considers the case where …rms use disciplinary dismissals in cases of redundancies in a model where …ring costs are bargained in the shadow of the law between employer and employee.
In the model, this is represented by the fact that some (true) disciplinary dismissal cases could be mistakenly considered in favour of the worker (i.e. "unfair") and some hidden redundancies could be mistakenly declared in favour of the …rm (i.e. "fair") by court. In other words, in the …rst case, workers are compensated when they should not. And in the second case, …rms avoid paying …ring costs when they should have paid them.
We de…ne m as the probability that a (true) disciplinary dismissal is mistakenly declared "unfair", where m > 0 given the information problem. That is, with probability m, disciplinary cases cost the "unfair" rate because they are declared in favour of the worker. Only with probability (1 ¡ m) there is no court mistake and disciplinary cases are costless to the …rm.
We de…ne z as the probability that a (hidden) redundancy is declared "unfair", where z < 1 given the information problem. That is, with probability (1 ¡ z), there is a court mistake and redundancies are costless to the …rm. Only with probability z, the worker is compensated for a redundancy case.
Firms can better prove that a (true) disciplinary dismissal is indeed disciplinary than to prove that a redundancy is a disciplinary case. That is, the probability that a dismissal taken to court is costless to the …rm is higher when it is a (true) disciplinary dismissal than when it is a (hidden) redundancy, or that z¸m: In other words, the probability that the case is declared in favour of the worker is lower when the case is a (true) disciplinary case.
We assume that the legislation …xes a severance payment of c for redundancies and a severance payment of C if the case is taken to court and is declared "unfair", where c · C. Then, given the double moral hazard problem, the …rm's expected …ring cost of a (true) disciplinary dismissal is mC and of a (hidden) redundancy is zC. To sum up, given the context described above, there is always an incentive for …rms to declare redundancies as disciplinary cases and for the worker to deny any disciplinary case. A further discussion of this double moral hazard problem is done in the last section of the paper. Let's assume that in case of redundancies presented as disciplinary cases, the …rm can never show evidence of the case and the cost is zC. In the case of real disciplinary cases, if the …rm is able to proof the case with probability k; then the cost is mC where mC´0(1 ¡ k) + kzC. Thus z¸m:
Non-shirking condition
In this section, we analyse the wage workers must be paid in order that they expend the optimal e¤ort on the job. Workers are risk neutral 12 . Their instantaneous utility function is: U (w; e) = w ¡ e; where w is the wage and e is the e¤ort. Workers e¤ort choices are discrete. If they shirk, they expend zero e¤ort and production is zero. The e¤ort required to perform in the job is e > 0.
Workers choose the level of e¤ort that maximises their utility actualised at rate r. By V i E ; we denote the present discounted utility of an employed worker when shirking (i=S) or non shirking (i=N). Firms want to o¤er a contract such that workers expend the optimal e¤ort. In what follows, the condition under which a worker will choose not to shirk is studied (the non-shirking condition, NSC).
When a worker does not shirk, he gets a utility equal to:
while if the worker decides to shirk his utility is:
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , shirking saves the current disutility of e¤ort but it implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk is proportional to the probability of being caught shirking (q). Firing costs also in ‡uence the e¤ort decision here because of the imperfect court decisions. With probability m; shirking workers may be compensated with a severance payment. This reduces the cost of shirking.
The worker will choose to provide an e¤ort e; if and only if V N E¸V S E . We can write this condition using equations (1) and (2) and get the NSC in form of utilities:
This condition states that in order to provide incentives, the punishment of losing a job must be at least equal to the opportunity cost of shirking, denoted by K. Substituting this condition in equation (1), we get the incentive compatible wage:
In this wage equation, we can distinguish between the reservation wage (…rst three terms) and the rent linked to the incentive problem (last term). For C = 0, this condition is the same as in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . In order to provide incentives, wages need to exceed the reservation wage by a rent, K: This rent is proportional to the opportunity cost of not shirking weighted by the term (r + b). The higher the discount rate, the more a worker values the saving of e¤ort today. The higher the probability of 12 For a model of …ring costs where workers are risk averse, see Booth (1997).
6 being …red for other reasons than (truly) shirking cases (i.e. shocks), the more costly it is to expend e¤ort today.
For C > 0, we can distinguish two types of e¤ects of …ring costs: those directly related with the incentive problem and those that are not. Firing costs a¤ect the incentive problem because to the extent that (truly) disciplinary dismissals are declared "unfair" (i.e., m > 0), legal severance payments reduce the punishment associated with being …red when caught shirking. This implies that …rms have to pay higher rents in order to prevent shirking, as can be seen in the above non-shirking condition (see equation (3)). This e¤ect of …ring costs has the same ‡avour as that in the insider-outsider theory, where …ring costs increase market power of incumbent workers.
At the same time, independently of the incentive problem, the introduction of mandated severance payments allows the employer to reduce the wage exactly by the same proportion that the present discounted utility of an employee is increased, without a¤ecting incentives. This can be seen in the …ring cost element of the reservation wage (see equation (4)). The idea is that lower wages today, together with compensation when being …red for shocks, leave the present discounted utility of being employed unchanged. This e¤ect of …ring costs is the same as that proposed by Lazear (1990) 13 . Although this last mechanism is not directly related with the incentive problem, it has very interesting links with e¢ciency wages in models in which …ring is not exogenous. As mentioned, in the standard e¢ciency wage model without severance payments, workers are paid a "…ring premium" in order to prevent shirking because expending e¤ort is more costly the higher the probability of being …red due to adverse economic shocks. When a severance payment is imposed, …rms face two opposite e¤ects in the presence of shocks: they have to pay an implicit …ring cost to avoid shirking (the "…ring premium"), but they can lower wages because workers are being compensated when …red after a shock 14 . An important further insight is made by Saint-Paul (1996) : in a dynamic e¢ciency wage model, it is in the interest of …rms to voluntarily include a severance pay in the labour contract that they o¤er. This is one possible way for the …rm to credibly commit to have a more stable employment policy when facing shocks, which then allows the …rm to reduce directly the "…ring premium" to be paid. The optimal severance payment is such that the "…ring premium" of the e¢ciency wage is completely compensated. In the present model, the imperfect court resolutions imply that …rms do not want to o¤er severance payments to workers 15 . 13 So, for m = 0, the two models have the same predictions (see section (2.4) where the market equilibrium is solved).
14 See Katsimi (1998) for a more detailed derivation of this mechanism in a fully stochastic e¢ciency wage model. 15 If m = 0, …rms would o¤er …ring costs in the present model. In the case of m = 0, for C = e=q the two models would coincide. Still, in the present model, severance payments are set legally while in Saint-Paul they are endogenous. See Booth (1997) for a discussion where the level of mandated …ring costs may di¤er from those bargained.
Back to the Non-Shirking Condition, if a contract satis…es the NSC, that is, if the worker is paid at least b w or, if being unemployed is a su¢ciently large punishment (V S E > V U ), the worker will choose to expend the e¤ort e. We de…ne V E as the expected utility in equilibrium. The …rm chooses the minimum wage at which the worker will not shirk, so that in equilibrium the N SC is binding and
Hiring decisions
All …rms in the model are identical and in…nitely lived. They chose employment so as to maximise the expected present value of pro…ts discounted at rate r. We denote by ¦ the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts. We have:
where f (L) is the production function with f
In the presence of …ring costs, the marginal cost of hiring a worker is given by the wage plus the future expected cost of being …red. There is no cost of posting vacancies, so …rms hire workers to the point where the marginal pro…t is zero, i.e. ¦ = 0. Labour demand in steady state is given by:
This equation shows that, for given wages, …ring costs reduce labour demand proportionally to their expected present value.
Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each …rm, taking as given all other …rms' wages and employment, …nds it optimal to o¤er the going wage rather than a di¤erent wage. The key market variable that determines …rm individual behaviour is the present value of the utility of an unemployed worker, V U . Let a be the rate of exit from unemployment. To simplify, we suppose that unemployment bene…ts are zero.
We have:
Given that the NSC is satis…ed, we have that in equilibrium:
Now, substituting equation (6) in equation (4), we get the e¢ciency wage curve in equilibrium:
In equilibrium, the incentive compatible wage is higher the higher the exit rate from unemployment. This result is also found in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . The rent linked with the incentive problem is weighted by a because the higher a; the less becoming unemployed is a penalty.
We derive employment, L, from the steady state ‡ows condition: in steady state in ‡ows to unemployment are given by bL. Out ‡ows are given by a(N ¡ L), where N is the total of workers in the economy. Thus,
Therefore,
Combining equations (5) and (7), we get that the equilibrium out ‡ow rate of unemployment, a ¤ , is given by:
In equation (9) , it can be seen that the second type of e¤ect of severance payments mentioned before can be fully undone: the second and the fourth element of this equation cancel out. The idea is that if markets are complete and perfect, and …ring costs are fully transferred to workers, then they are neutral on employment because the wage is reduced by the same proportion as the increased shadow cost of labour (see Lazear (1990) ).
However, in this model, even if …ring costs are fully received by workers, they are not neutral because they a¤ect the rent, K. The e¤ects of severance payments on the e¢ciency wage setting have no counteracting e¤ects through the non-wage component of the shadow cost of labour. Therefore, the wage schedule is shifted to the left and it has a negative impact e¤ect on employment. It is interesting to note that even if the wage is set by the …rm, it is not possible to fully endogenize the severance payments in the workers' wage. As mentioned, this result is due to the presence of a double moral hazard problem that can only be resolved imperfectly by a third party. This implies that …ring costs have a real e¤ect because they reduce the cost of shirking.
The aggregate N SC can also be written in terms of the unemployment rate, u. Replacing equation (8) into equation (7), we get:
This expression can be represented in the (w ; L) space. Figure 1 shows the labour market e¤ects of neutral and non-neutral …ring costs. The case where …ring costs are neutral corresponds to the case where there is not such a double moral hazard problem 16 . A further discussion on this problem and some policy implications is developed in the next section. In such a case, disciplinary dismissals have zero cost and therefore they do not a¤ect the rent to be paid to workers. Consequently, …ring costs are neutral on employment.
W L L (C=0)
Non
Policy implications
In the model presented above, the existence of job protection legislation in a context in which worker e¤ort is not perfectly observable implied that …ring costs had a negative e¤ect on employment. As explained, the problem in such a system is that there is always an incentive for con ‡ict between employer and employee, i.e. for the employer to claim any dismissal to be disciplinary and for the worker to deny any disciplinary case. This, in turn, implies imperfect resolutions by third parties. The goal of this section is to discuss some possible policy implications derived from the model above.
The mechanism that generates such double moral hazard problem is that, for …rms, the expected cost of a redundancy is higher than the expected cost of declaring it a disciplinary dismissal. And in turn, for workers, the expected bene…t of denying a disciplinary dismissal becomes positive. Following the model presented above (see Table 1 ), when …rms declare redundancies as disciplinary cases and workers deny all disciplinary cases, the court is not able to perfectly detect all the true disciplinary cases. The court is able to catch a hidden redundancy only with probability z. And it is able to discover true disciplinary cases only with probability (1 ¡ m). Therefore, …rms …nd it worth it to declare disciplinary cases when facing redundancies if:
If …rms misuse disciplinary cases, then workers have an incentive to deny any of them because:
If these two conditions are met, then the double moral hazard is an equilibrium. That is, all dismissals are taken to court as disciplinary cases. As shown in the previous section, in such a case, …ring costs are not neutral on employment. As can be seen from conditions (10) and (11), policies that concentrate on undoing the double moral hazard problem do not necessarily imply the complete removal of severance payments.
As mentioned, in general, most employment protection legislation systems set higher severance payments for cases being declared "unfair" than for those considered "fair". The idea behind this goes in the right direction in the sense that it tries to punish for unjust dismissals. For large enough C, the incentive of …rms to cheat could be undone (see equation (10) ) and therefore, there would be no double moral hazard 17 . In such a case, high severance payments for "unfair" dismissals have a punishment role for …rms who would use disciplinary dismissals when facing a redundancy. However, such a policy may not be su¢cient. If C fails to be high enough, it motivates cheating from both agents which in turn generates imperfect court decisions. And the resulting average cost of …ring is higher because some dismissals are paid at the "unfair" rate. Moreover, this does not seem to be the most e¢cient policy since it does not have any punishment role for the worker when he denies true disciplinary cases.
A more e¢cient policy would be one that punishes any agent found lying. That is, on the one hand, to set a severance payment that …rms have to pay, C F , when the court catches a hidden redundancy. On the other hand, to set a penalty for workers, C w , whenever caught denying a true disciplinary dismissal. Table 2 summarises the expected costs of …ring for the …rm and worker under such policy proposal. Under such a policy, taking m and z as given, truth-telling of both agents is an equilibrium if the following two conditions are satis…ed:
Note that for any given m and z; a high enough gap between severance payments for cases declared "unfair" and cases declared "fair", that is for a large C F ¡ c, and for any positive penalty to the worker, that is C w , the above conditions would hold.
This policy highlights that for an employment protection system to work, specially when worker e¤ort is not observable, two things are important. First, the di¤erence between the level of …ring costs set for cases declared "unfair" and "fair" has to be high enough. Second, di¤erent indemnities should be set for "unfair" cases depending on whether it is considered that it is the worker's or the …rm's initiative.
Conclusion
Firing costs are often blamed for depressing employment levels. But there are very di¤erent views of …ring costs among economists: some models indeed predict that …ring costs reduce employment while in other contexts …ring costs have no e¤ect on employment. Also, in some other environments, …ring costs are actually instruments chosen voluntarily by …rms. In this paper, we have proposed a model that stresses that it is not just the level of severance payments what matters, but a wider view of employment protection. In particular, dismissal con ‡icts and their cost have been considered. As discussed before, the model presented integrates the di¤erent existing views of …ring costs.
More precisely, we have analysed the problem behind the con ‡ict between employer and employee in cases of disciplinary dismissals and redundancies, in a context where e¤ort is imperfectly observable. There is a double moral hazard problem that can only be resolved imperfectly by a third party. The conclusion is that …ring costs would have a negative e¤ect on employment because they modify the rent to be paid to workers in order to prevent those workers from shirking.
The main policy conclusions are two. First, to set a gap wide enough between severance payments for cases declared "unfair" and cases declared "fair". Second, any agent caught lying should be punished. In our model, di¤erent severance payments should be set for hidden redundancies declared "unfair" and for truly disciplinary cases declared "unfair". With such a policy, the di¤erent …ring costs for "unfair" dismissals have a punishment role for both employer and employee and, therefore, its implementation would eliminate the double moral hazard problem.
In this paper we have explored one possible reason behind imperfect court resolutions and their implication for employment. That is, the fact that e¤ort, which motivates disciplinary dismissals, is not perfectly observable. There are other reasons why court's decisions could be imperfect. In our context, there is the problem of de…ning a dismissal case precisely. For instance, in the case of redundancies, it is di¢cult to set unquestionably "how bad" the economic situation of a …rm must be in order to have an objective reason to …re a worker. Similarly, for disciplinary dismissals, it is di¢cult to set the degree of the worker's fault that justi…es dismissal. This leaves room for interpretation implying again that resolutions will tend to be imperfect. Other possible reasons are related with what the legislation considers as an "unfair" dismissal itself, something that di¤ers across countries (see OECD (1999)). Or, how complex the dismissal procedures are because this implies potentially more strict proofs in order to win a case. In Galdón and Güell (1999), we incorporate these elements in a theoretical model and undertake an empirical analysis to test the magnitude of dismissal con ‡icts and labour market outcomes for di¤erent countries.
